A Great Depression, However, Will Not

金融時報的文章精簡而到肉，值得參巧:

還元基本法，美國救市方案主力是為「Mortgage-Backed Securities」作出擔保，目標是令一些「Illquid Assets」重新得到金融體系的信任。換個說法，一些早前已經「綁死左」的資金可以重投市場，其中涉及不少「Money Market funds」。

新修訂的救市方案還包括協助大眾(Main Street)的措施，例如稅務優惠以及加大存款保障金額。

始終聯儲局及政府能做的是「提供新血 (Pump in Liquidity)」和「通血管 (Bail-out Plan)」，最終還要看「器官」的虛實。把一把脈，美國經濟有穩下來的跡象，至低限度可能「離底不遠」。

然而，即使方案再次被否決(雖然機會很細)，美國會否再面臨1929至1933年式的大衰退? 機會似乎很微:

1) 1929年以「金本位制度(Gold Reserve System)」為貨幣政策的根據，黃金流走後(經濟轉弱後，入口少了，出口多了)，美國政府為了保衛美元而抽走市場的資金來購入黃金
2) 由於內部政治鬥爭，聯儲局當時並沒有減息和提供流動性，相反實行偏緊的貨幣政策
3) 結果是金融市場的流動資金枯乾，結果令很多銀行倒閉。其中不少本身資金充裕的銀行因為大量恐慌式擠提而被迫結業
4) 再加上1929年的美國人並非富有，沒有可觀的財富和現金流去維持消費
5) 製造業相對總就業人數的比率很高，而製造業相關職位的穩定性很低，經濟轉弱便等同失業率大升
6) 1929年美國所有資產市場都嚴重過熱，而民間過度借貸和投資，其後泡沫爆破的後遺症嚴重
7) 歐洲經濟又轉差，出口都不行

結果是經濟大蕭條，直至1933年美國總統羅斯福推出救市方案，同時間亦取消該死的「金本位制度」......


「經濟大蕭條」，一知半解的人還是慎言為妙!!

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Consequences of No Bail-Out
(Financial Times; 30 Sep 08)

The US banking system is like Schrodinger's unfortunate cat. Until the US Congress decides to back the bail-out package or not, it is caught in a curious state between death and undeath. What are the consequences of either result?

Life, with a variant of the Paulson plan, should be calmer. If the Treasury can create prices for mortgage backed paper by acting as a buyer, it will have two positive effects. Capital that is now useless will re-enter the system. And reasonable valuations will help banks to come clean about their exposure. Bank failures lie ahead – the credit party hangover must still be faced – but some trust should return. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should then be able to deal clinically with stricken institutions as it has done so far, without paralysing the system.

However, if the plan is blown away by political winds, bank funding will continue to dry up as cash is hoarded. Commercial paper markets will remain dysfunctional. Absent such short term funding, companies will be forced to draw more heavily on pre-arranged revolving credit lines. Money market funds, the arteries of the economy, could again seize up. Bankruptcies, both financial and otherwise, will follow.

A great depression, however, will not. It will be unpleasant, but banks have suffered bouts of distrust before. The eurodollar Ted spread – which measures the difference between the risk-free rate of US T-Billls and interbank lending rates – was above current levels for prolonged periods in 1973-74, and in the early 1980s. Merrill Lynch, using IMF data on the 124 banking crises of the past 27 years, points out that the cost to the taxpayer averages 13 per cent of GDP. The greater the spending, it seems, the smaller the hit to growth in the following years. The longer it takes the authorities to start cleaning up, the greater the eventual bill.